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The article analyzes the impact of the oil and gas industry on the socio-political stability
in Kazakhstan. The ﬁrst part will look at the role of the industry for the development of
the country with a special focus on the political risks that might result from the orien-
tation towards raw material production. The relationship between business and politics
will be examined as well as the management model of the energy sector and the impact
of corruption on social and political stability. The second part of the article will focus on
the population's attitude towards public protests and aims to explain why the willingness
to participate in protests has been rising. A case study on the protests of oil industry
workers in the city of Zhanaozen in December 2011 will be presented in order to better
understand the causes of the protests, the demands of the protesters and the relationship
between state and society. The article concludes with a summary of results and an
outlook for the development of the oil and gas industry and socio-political stability in
Kazakhstan.
Copyright © 2015, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Since the late 1990s, Kazakhstan has been experiencing
an oil boom. Within one decade, from 1998 until 2008, oil
exports increased three times while world market prices
for oil rose six-fold during the same period. As a result, fuel
accounted for 70% of all merchandise exports by the end of




nter, Hanyang University. Prod(GDP) rose on average by 8% per year until the global
ﬁnancial and economic crisis of 2008 led to a slowdown.
In reaction to the oil boom, Kazakhstan has adopted a
conservative macroeconomic policy with the goal of saving
the earnings from raw material exports by increasing the
country's gold and foreign currency reserves. Although
such a strategy allows the country to protect the national
economy during economic crises, allowing for increased
state spending to counter the economic downturn and to
mitigate the social consequences, it stimulates economic
growth and development only to a very limited extent. As a
result, such a strategy is unable to improve the structural
characteristics of the economy and to raise the population's
standard of living signiﬁcantly and sustainably.
Despite attempts to diversify the structure of the
economy and to mitigate dependence on naturaluction and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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commonly described as a ‘resource curse’.1 Three prob-
lems resulting from the oil boom are especially relevant
for Kazakhstan. First, the country suffers from ‘growth
without development’, i.e., economic growth is not
accompanied by sustainable socio-economic develop-
ment. Second, a high level of corruption in combination
with a weak system of state management culminates in
the opaque management of natural resources by a narrow
circle of government ofﬁcials. And third, poverty has been
persistent. Although the president stresses the reduction
of poverty as one of his economic aims, inequality has
been growing. While a small group has beneﬁted
immensely from the oil boom, large parts of the popula-
tion have not proﬁted proportionally. A major reason for
this is that the oil industry does not create many jobs and,
moreover, often suppresses the development of other
sectors of the Kazakh economy (Howie & Atakhanova,
2014; Pleines, 2012).
Despite the popular slogan of Kazakh authorities ‘First
the economy, then politics’, claiming that economic
development as a priority can be separated from political
reforms, the rentier state approach seems to be applicable
to the country. In the rentier state, which derivesmost of its
income from the export of natural resources, the state
budget is not dependent on taxes and taxpayers. Instead,
elites depend on the revenue from natural resources sold
on foreign markets with prices determined by external
conditions. In such a resource dependent country, access to
the natural resource industry determines success in society,
and control over the resource industry determines political
power. The lack of democratic traditions makes the distri-
bution of income from the resource industry non-
transparent. This results in a sharp rise in corruption, a
huge discrepancy between the incomes of the general
population and the elite, and a growing dissatisfaction
among the populace. As a result, a society that focuses on
access to rents and on hegemony overmarginalised parts of
the population is formed.
In this context, this article scrutinises the social and
political consequences of Kazakhstan's economic depen-
dence on oil. It starts with a brief analysis of the country's
ﬁscal policy to show the distribution of rents in society. The
analysis then continues with a look at the oil elite and the
attitude of the broader population. To assess the tensions
resulting from the rentier state characteristics of
Kazakhstan, a case study is presented of the protest events
of December 2011 in the town of Zhanaozen, Mangistau1 The term ‘resource curse’ refers to the paradox that countries with a
sizeable endowment of natural resources have largely been unsuccessful
in translating the resulting wealth into economic development, social
prosperity and political stability. Beginning in the late 1980s, empirical
studies showed the opposite trend, asserting that natural resource
abundance increases the likelihood that countries will experience nega-
tive economic, political and social outcomes, including poor economic
performance, increased income inequality, widespread poverty, low
levels of democracy, high levels of corruption and a greater likelihood of
civil war. This literature has been extremely inﬂuential: the idea that
natural resources are bad for development is now widely accepted. For a
review of the literature and a critical discussion with a focus on the
Caspian states see Heinrich, 2012.region, where a labour conﬂict in the oil and gas company
OzenMunaiGaz developed into a huge social and political
protest resulting in the death of several people and the
arrests of representatives of opposition groups.2. Kazakhstan's ﬁscal policy: The oil factor
To manage the state income from natural resources,
Kazakhstan, like many other oil producing countries, has
formed a sovereign wealth fund, the National Fund of the
Republic of Kazakhstan. The Fund, which was set up in
2000, has as its main mission to save ﬁnancial resources
for future generations and to reduce the country's
dependence on international raw material markets. To
fulﬁl its savings function, the minimum savings amount
has been deﬁned for the National Fund, while its maximal
size is unlimited. The Fund's stabilisation function is
assured by the provision of a guaranteed transfer to the
state budget (for a detailed analysis of this aspect see:
Azhgaliyeva, 2014). At present, this amount is established
at a rate of US$8 billion, which can be reduced or increased
up to 15%, depending on the situation of the economy.2
The assets of the National Fund, which totalled US$65
billion in 2013, are ofﬁcially forecasted to rise to US$122
billion in 2016.
The formation of the National Fund and its functioning
is a vivid example of the low level of transparency both in
the extractive industry and in the whole system of income
distribution from raw material exports. The monitoring
system over the National Fund is strongly linked to the
president. At the helm of the Fund is a special management
council, formed and chaired by President Nursultan Naza-
rbayev. It further includes the prime minister, the heads of
the two chambers of parliament, the National Bank
chairman and the ﬁnance minister. The fund is ﬁducially
managed by the National Bank and overseen by the council.
However, the council has only advisory capacities; its main
task is to provide assistance and develop recommendations
for the president, who actually issues the directives, which
are binding on the council, the government and the Na-
tional Bank, with regard to matters relating to the Fund
(Kalyuzhnova, 2006, 2012).
It can be assumed that the majority of the council
members by their status in the bureaucratic hierarchy are
connected with different elite groups, and future power
struggles by these groups will reﬂect on the activity of the
council itself. To classify the existing threats to maintaining
political stability in Kazakhstan, the Alliance of Analytical
Organizations of Kazakhstan conducted an expert poll in
October 2012 among political and social scientists, public
ﬁgures, and political analysts of Kazakhstan's mass media.
The majority of experts involved in the poll consider that
intra-elite conﬂicts pose the most serious threat to political
stability in Kazakhstan. A second important threat is the
polarisation of society. The third most signiﬁcant threat to2 ‘O kontseptsii formirovaniya i ispol'zovaniya sredstv Natsional'nogo
fonda Respubliki Kazakhstan’, Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan, 2
April 2010, No. 962, http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/U100000962_, last
accessed 15 November 2014.
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federal centre and the regions (Alliance of Analytical
Organizations, 2014).
In this regard, Edward Prescott proposed the creation of
a wide base of stakeholders by transferring parts of the
money that Kazakhstan receives from oil exports to the
bank accounts of each Kazakhstani citizen for the people to
invest and/or spend individually.3 However, such proposals
contradict the existing economic policy which is based on
the use of enormous resources from the budget and the
National Fund.
That is, the income received from raw material exports
is used to ﬁnance the inefﬁcient industrial and innovative
development programme that has not released
Kazakhstan from its raw material addiction and has not
created competitive commodity producers. Even the
cautious deputies of Kazakhstan's Parliament stated in
March 2014 that they do not see any effect from imple-
mentation of the industrial and innovative development
programme. In particular, the former Minister of Labour
and Social Protection, now deputy, Gulzhan Karagusova,
said that the ﬁnal goal of the programme's ﬁrst stage was
to diversify the economy, reduce imports, increase pay-
ments to the state budget and saturate the domestic
market with qualitative goods of domestic origin. Unfor-
tunately, after 5 years, none of these tasks have been
achieved (Tashkinbaev, 2014).
In a similar vein, in a report by Transparency Interna-
tional and the Revenue Watch Institute on the revenue
transparency of 44 international oil and gas companies in
2010 (that is, one year prior to the events in Zhanaozen),
Kazakhstan's national oil and gas company KazMunaiGaz
(KMG) was categorised as absolutely intransparent. Ac-
cording to Transparency International and the Revenue
Watch Institute, if the companies' capital ﬂows were more
transparent, the opportunity for corruption would be
lessened and more money would be available for devel-
opment (Atabayev, 2011).4 In fact, according to the Ministry of Industry and New Technologies of
Kazakhstan, the country's current forecasted geological reserves are
estimated to be worth approximately US$9 trillion. (‘Podschitali stoimost’
vsekh zapasov syr'ya v Kazakhstane’, in: Nur.kz, 14 December 2010,
http://news.nur.kz/170894.html). However, these data differ from that
submitted by the experts of the RIA Rating Agency who came to the
conclusion that all of Kazakhstan's natural reserves in money equivalent
are equal to US$3.8 trillion. (‘Kazakhstan vladeet neft'yu i gazom pochti3. Popular discontent
The traditional slogan of Kazakh authorities ‘First the
economy, then politics’ actually has a double meaning. On
the one hand, more attention was indeed given to eco-
nomic reforms rather than to political ones. However, on
the other hand, the economic system is closely connected
with the political elite; the so-called ‘nomenclature capi-
talism’ (Burawoy, 1995) preserves the ‘resource curse’
under which the country continues to depend on the sale of
raw materials without creating an efﬁcient system of dis-
tribution of this income.
As a result, the feeling of social injustice is gradually
spreading among various layers of the population. Larger
parts of the population are increasingly disappointed by
the discrepancy between the availability of considerable
natural riches and the income generated by their sale and3 ‘Delit'sya neftedokhodami prizyvaet ne tolko oppozitsiya’, in: Radio
Azattyk, 4 June 2012, http://rus.azattyk.org/content/oil-petroincome-
prescott-zhandosov-taizhan-baitasov/24602645.html.the standard of living for the majority of the population.4
Under speciﬁc conditions this dissatisfaction can translate
into open protest.
In December 2013, the British research centre Econo-
mist Intelligence Unit (EIU) conducted a survey of various
countries' risk of social unrest. It compiled a list of countries
with a ‘high risk’ of social unrest in 2014 that included
Kazakhstan among several other post-Soviet countries. In
the opinion of EIU's expert Laza Kekic: ‘Decline in incomes
and high unemployment rates are not always followed by
unrest. Only when economic trouble is accompanied by
other elements of vulnerability is there a high risk of
instability. Such factors include wide-income inequality,
poor government, low levels of social provision, ethnic
tensions and a history of unrest. Of particular importance in
sparking unrest in recent times appears to have been an
erosion of trust in governments and institutions […]’
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013). Parts of this scenario
seem to have been in place in Kazakhstan already for some
time.
A representative poll of the population of Kazakhstan
conducted by the Central Asian Fund for Democracy
Development under the supervision of one of the authors
of this article in 2010 shows that 63% of the population are
convinced that the means of the National Fund are spent
inefﬁciently, while only a quarter of the population has a
positive view of the Fund's expenditure policy. At the same
time, 58% of the interviewed Kazakhstani citizens noted the
inaccessibility of the data on the accumulation and distri-
bution of monies from the National Fund. While a further
32% of the respondents considered information available in
the mass media to be insufﬁcient, only 10% of the re-
spondents were satisﬁed with information submitted by
state agencies. In the meantime, the demand for informa-
tion about the Fund's activity is high: 77% of the re-
spondents are sure that the country's citizens have the
right to know how ﬁnancial assets of the National Fund are
accumulated and distributed (Umbetaliyeva, 2010: 156).
Galib Yefendiyev, Eurasia Regional Coordinator of the
RevenueWatch Institute, drew attention to onemore factor
that affects the growth of social tension in Kazakhstan's oil
and gas producing regions. In Kazakhstan, subnational
budgets receive transfers from the federal budget. How-
ever, there is no legislation specifying what share of reve-
nues should be returned to the producer regions, how often
the transfers should be made and under what formula the
amount should be calculated. However, it would help to
assuage discontent of the local population in thosena $3,7 trln.’, in: Kapital, 20 March 2013, http://kapital.kz/ratings/12755/
kazahstan-vladeet-neftyu-i-gazom-pochti-na-3-7-trln.html). Even under
more modest estimates, Kazakhstan's oil and gas reserves in money
equivalent per capita is estimated at about US$236,000 per Kazakhstani
citizen.
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returned to the regions from the federal centre
(Тrubacheva, 2014).
The results of the opinion poll carried out in 2010 show
that despite the observed growth of protest moods, protest
actions were not expected to take place. Thus, 70% of re-
spondents assessed the probability of mass protest actions
as ‘low’ even with the deterioration of the economic situ-
ation, and only 24% thought that the discontent could
develop into protest actions. Though the potential of pro-
tests was high, with 41% of the respondents noting that
they themselves had a reason to protest, only 9% claimed
that they would be willing to assert their rights by
participating in meetings and strikes (Umbetaliyeva, 2010:
157).
In fact, according to data from the Kazakhstan Bureau
for Human Rights and Rule of Law for the period
2012e2013, a reduction in the level of protest actions could
be observed in Kazakhstan. One major reason seems to be
state repression, as 85% of demonstrations were held
without permits from local authorities. Overall, 119
peaceful meetings were registered from October 2012 to
September 2013 in Kazakhstan, 74 of them were related to
social and economic issues and 45 to ecological and legal
issues (Asautay, 2013).
The potential for popular discontent and peaceful pro-
test actions to escalate into violent conﬂict was demon-
strated by the notorious events of December 2011 in
Zhanaozen in the Mangistau region; a labour conﬂict in the
oil and gas company OzenMunaiGaz caused mass protests
and led to the death of several people and the arrests of the
representatives of opposition groups. These events also
demonstrate the link between the oil industry, the rentier
state and societal tensions.6 In particular, in February 2009, the trade union of coal miners,
Коrgau, opposed a wage reduction for miners introduced by the man-
agement of Arcelor Mittal Temirtau. In March 2010, trade unions went to
court to force the management of Arcelor Mittal Temirtau to pay the 13th
wage to the personnel as stipulated in their contracts. In November 2011,4. Case study: The protests in Zhanaozen
4.1. Popular discontent in the oil producing regions
Workers in the oil producing regions of Western
Kazakhstan feel excluded from the economic prosperity of
the country's major urban centres, such as the cities Almaty
and Astana (for detailed case studies see J€ager, 2014;
Lobacheva, 2012). While workers in the Mangistau region
produce close to 70% of the country's oil output, they live
and work in difﬁcult conditions with many households
lacking basic services (Khamidov, 2011; Sakal, 2014).
The oil town Zhanaozen, where the major protests took
place in 2011, has considerable socioeconomic problems.
Predominantly ethnically Kazakh, its population more than
doubled from 2000 to 2010 to more than 125,000, due to
the oil boom that attracted the inﬂux of better paid foreign
workers and of migrants (mostly ethnic Kazakhs that have
lived abroad, so-called oralman).5 However, Zhanaozen and
the Mangistau region offer few opportunities: the economy5 Since 1991, over 900,000 ethnic Kazakhs have moved to the country.
The majority of oralman, 61%, came from Uzbekistan, approximately 12%
came from China, 10% from Mongolia, approximately 8% from
Turkmenistan and 5% from Russia.is heavily dominated by oil production, which does not
create many jobs. Most goods have to be imported at high
prices, as the small business sector is underdeveloped. As a
result, unemployment is high (cf. Kilner, 2011;
Kourmanova, 2012; Lillis, 2011a).
The disproportion in the remuneration of labour be-
tween foreign and local specialists is a source of tensions in
the Kazakh oil and gas industry. Prior to the events of
December 2011, there were already labour conﬂicts in
Kazakhstan's oil producing regions concerning unfair
remuneration. At that time the monthly wage of a qualiﬁed
engineer amounted to KZT 150,000 on average in
Kazakhstan. In the Аtyrau region, in which many foreign
personnel are employed, it stood at KZT 193,000, while in
the Mangistau region, it was KZT 207,000. The higher
wages in turn have an impact on the prices in the region.
While some in the region, namely managers and well-
trained foreign workers, earn more and can afford higher
prices, others who earn less than average salaries see their
income in real terms reduced below the poverty rate. As a
result, social inequality is higher in the oil producing re-
gions of Western Kazakhstan. In October 2011, the poverty
rate was 22% higher than the country average (Abishev,
2011).
The tensions between the local population, ethnic ‘re-
patriates’ (oralman) and the foreign labour force have
increased (cf. Kourmanova, 2012; Kus¸çu, 2014). However,
not only between these groups are the tensions rising. The
majority of oralman are dissatisﬁed with their situation
after moving to Kazakhstan, which makes their community
susceptible to various political inﬂuences and increases
their protest potential, as was clearly observed in the
events in Zhanaozen. Among the striking oil workers at
Zhanaozen approximately a quarter were oralman
(Zhampeissov, 2013).
Wage discrepancies and related discontent also exist in
other segments of Kazakhstan's economy. For example,
labour conﬂicts constantly occur at the largest mining and
metallurgical enterprise in Kazakhstan, the foreign-owned
Arcelor Mittal.6 However, the peculiar feature of Zhanaozen
was that the labour conﬂict began not in a foreign company
but in the subsidiaries of the national state-controlled oil
and gas company KMG, which gave the state's leadership
direct responsibility.
A labour dispute at KMG's oil producing subsidiary
OzenMunaiGaz (ОМG) had previously taken place in
September 2009 and was accompanied by a hunger strike
of several workers demanding a change in the remunera-
tion system and a wage raise. According to mass mediatrade unions again started to conduct bargaining for a wage increase with
the board of Arcelor Mittal Temirtau. However, the two sides could not
reach an agreement. Therefore, the trade unions convened labour arbi-
tration. In July 2012, over 3000 employees of various shops of the
metallurgical plant Arcelor Mittal Temirtau went to the meeting
demanding to increase their wages by 30%.
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of the oil workers; however, it remained unclear in what
way and to what extent. In March 2010, there was another
strike of OMG's workers because of disagreements over the
transition to a new remuneration system. To settle this
conﬂict, the company's management formed a special
commission involving state bodies. This special commis-
sion inspected the legality of the demands of the strikers; it
came to the conclusion that the demands of the workers
were groundless (Khramkov, 2011).
4.2. The protests in 2011
The violent mass protests of 2011 started with a
peaceful strike by thousands of oil workers at three com-
panies on 26May 2011 after labour activists had called for a
general strike across the Mangistau region. The three
companies were ОМG in Zhanaozen, KarazhanbasMunai, a
KMG-Chinese joint venture near the port city of Aktau, and
Ersai Caspian Contractor, a joint venture by the Italian ENI
and ERC Holdings of Kazakhstan. The workers demanded
amendments to the collective bargaining agreement
adopted in 2010, aiming at a pay increase (through the
inclusion of regional and industry coefﬁcients for the
calculation of their wages), equal rights with foreign
workers (including equal pay), and the lifting of restrictions
on the activities of independent labour unions in the region
(Salmon, 2011: 507).7
The oil companies were uncompromising over the key
demand of higher take-home pay. Managers claimed they
pay salaries that are well above average and they
embraced an aggressive approach in dealing with the
strikers (Khamidov, 2011). KMG insisted that salaries had
been raised six times since 2008 and that it offered strikers
the chance to return to work. Verifying KMG's wage
assertion is complicated due to a complex salary-
calculation system that makes gauging take-home pay
difﬁcult. Salaries in western regions are the highest na-
tionally, but the cost of living is above average, and living
and working conditions are tough (Lillis, 2011a; Nasimova,
2011: 98).
Negotiations to address workers' complaints are
hampered by the unwillingness of state oil companies to
recognise informal labour unions. Employers insisted on
negotiating only with workers organised in the ofﬁcial
Federation of Labour Unions of Kazakhstan, which often
follows the government line and is therefore not trusted by
strikers (Khamidov, 2011).
The companies appeared to beneﬁt from the tacit sup-
port of the local government. To stop further strikes, the
company's managers addressed the judicial bodies of the
Mangistau region and the town of Zhanaozen, which
considered all protest actions illegal, meaning that the
strikers were subject to dismissal under the law. The court
decisions were based on the fact that the strike actions did
not follow the exact procedure stipulated in the Kazakh
Labour Code (Khramkov, 2011).7 ‘State of Emergency in Restive Kazakh Town’, in: Eurasianet.org, 17
December 2011, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64727.In the summer of 2011, KarazhanbasMunai's and OMG's
management decided to dismiss more than 2000 em-
ployees involved in the protest. In response, some of the
dismissed oil workers appealed to the court of Zhanaozen
to reinstate them to their jobs, but the court refused to do
so. Instead, the strike organisers were arrested and con-
victed. The threat of retribution prompted many disgrun-
tled employees to return to work: the number of strikers
fell sharply. KMG then moved to declare the strike over.
However, tensions remained high (Khamidov, 2011; Lillis,
2011a; Nasimova, 2011: 97).
After their dismissal, a large group of the workers set up
a tent city in Zhanaozen's central square. From there, they
kept up their protest, demanding reinstatement and a re-
view of salaries. The protestors who considered themselves
still to be company staff but had not received anymoney for
several months hoped that the authorities would intervene
on their behalf (Lillis, 2011a).
Amid growing concern over the economic impact of
the labour action, the federal government intervened to
broker a genuine compromise. The simmering conﬂict
had been lowering the country's oil output; the economic
costs of the labour unrest started to draw Astana's
attention. KMG reported that it produced 9.2 million
metric tonnes of crude oil during the ﬁrst three quarters
of 2011, 7% less than during the same period in the pre-
vious year. According to Timur Kulibayev, at that time the
head of the Samruk-Kazyna fund that oversees Kazakh-
stan's state companies (including KMG), the strike caused
great damage to state coffers. Kulibayev estimated that
strike-related losses to the state would approach KZT 54
billion (US$365 million) in 2011. He also said KMG faced
an annual loss of KZT 40 billion (US$270 million) as a
result. That is why, Kulibayev offered a compromise to the
dismissed workers in late-September. ‘They are our peo-
ple and we should work with them’, he said. ‘We are not
giving up on helping them ﬁnd employment’. Kulibayev
said alternative jobs on a railroad project had been pro-
posed, but turned down (Lillis, 2011a; Nasimova, 2011:
97).
The conﬂict then escalated on 16 December 2011
(Kazakhstan's Independence Day). On Zhanaozen's central
square, where hundreds of protesters had set up their tents
for more than sixmonths, at least 16 peoplewere killed and
more than 100 injured (cf. Kourmanova, 2012) when
shooting broke out as police tried to clear the square for
preparations for the Independence Day celebrations. The
protesters started throwing rocks and whistling. A crowd
stormed a stage erected for an Independence Day party,
smashing sound equipment. They reportedly later set ﬁre
to the city hall, the headquarters of the local oil company
OMG, a hotel, several other buildings and vehicles. Eye-
witnesses said police ﬁred on unarmed protesters but the
authorities claimed they were forced to defend themselves
(Lillis, 2011b; Salmon, 2011, 2012).88 ‘State of Emergency in Restive Kazakh Town’, in: Eurasianet.org, 17
December 2011, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64727; ‘Kazakh Zha-
naozen Oil Unrest Spreads to Regional Capital’, in: BBC, 18 December
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16235282.
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a curfew in Zhanaozen. Under the 20-day state of emer-
gency, rallies, protests, and strikes were prohibited; it
restricted freedom of movement around the city and also
limited access to and from the city. The authorities trans-
ferred large numbers of soldiers to the region and cut
Internet and phone communications to control the ﬂow of
information. They then claimed that the situation was
under control and vowed perpetrators of the unrest would
be punished (Kilner, 2011; Lillis, 2011c).9
Nevertheless, another person died on 17 December, and
11 were injured when security forces opened ﬁre in a
railway settlement in the nearby village of Shetpe. Pro-
testers blocked the railway line to support the striking
workers in Zhanaozen. After protesters set ﬁre to a freight
locomotive and threw petrol bombs at the wagons, they
rioted in the village, burning a New Year's tree, and
smashing shop and car windows. When police came under
attack with petrol bombs and stones, they were forced to
use their weapons, the prosecutors said.10
On 18 December, oil workers gathered outside the
mayor's ofﬁce in Aktau to show solidarity with those
workers killed in Zhanaozen. Riot police confronted them,
cordoning off the area to keep the protesters from drawing
a larger crowd. By 21 December, the solidarity protest had
dwindled to approximately 60 people (Lillis, 2011d).114.3. Reaction of the state
Prior to the riots the authorities had been quite suc-
cessful in blocking credible reporting about the long-
lasting labour dispute from appearing in the Kazakh
press. To make sure the labour unrest remained contained,
government media outlets carried reports discrediting the
strikers by ‘exposing the greed’ of the oilmen. Thus, the
strikers found it difﬁcult to convey their message to
workers in other economic sectors. As a result, labour un-
rest remained conﬁned largely to the Mangistau region.
Therefore, for the major part of the population the
events of December 2011 were unexpected (Khamidov,
2011).12 After the outbreak of violence, pro-government
newspapers blamed the conﬂict on the striking workers
and opposition groups, while shielding the security forces
from any blame. They also relied solely on the ofﬁcial ac-
counts of the conﬂict. Talk of a provocation by external
forces has been aired in the state-controlled media, and the
Internet was rife with speculation (Lillis, 2011d). As quali-
tative research has shown, information provided by the9 ‘State of Emergency in Restive Kazakh Town’, in: Eurasianet.org, 17
December 2011, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64727; ‘State of Emer-
gency in Restive Kazakh Town’, in: Eurasianet.org, 17 December 2011,
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64727.
10 ‘Kazakh Zhanaozen Oil Unrest Spreads to Regional Capital’, in: BBC, 18
December 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16235282.
11 ‘Kazakh Zhanaozen Oil Unrest Spreads to Regional Capital’, in: BBC, 18
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12 “Shok budushchego” ili politicheskie strakhi kazakhstantsev (resul'-
taty sotsiologicheskogo oprosa), in: Al'yans Analiticheskikh Organizatsiy
(2013) ‘Sumerechnaya zona’ ili lobushki perekhodnogo perioda, Almaty:
Al'yans Analiticheskikh Organizatsiy, pp. 177e183.ofﬁcial mass media in December 2011 and later was very
poor and brief.13 Pro-opposition newspapers on the other
hand covered the conﬂict from both sides and presented a
more nuanced picture (Bissenov, 2013; Nasimova, 2011:
98).
From the very beginning, state ofﬁcials tried to down-
play the role of internal factors in this conﬂict by stressing
the activity of external players. Although a government
investigation commission had just begun work, President
Nazarbayev absolved the police and blamed the ‘criminal
actions’ of protestors for the violence. He expressed doubt
about a statement by Interior Minister Kalmukhanbet
Kasymov who said the clashes were provoked by dismissed
staff members of OMG. Nazarbayev said that industrial
dispute must not be mixed up with the actions of bandit
elements that wanted to use the situation for their criminal
schemes (Lillis, 2011c, 2011d).
In particular, the Kazakh authorities accused the former
banker Mukhtar Ablyazov for organising the disorder and
provoking the conﬂict in Zhanaozen, as he was seen as
ﬁnancing not only opposition mass media but also part of
the Kazakh opposition in the form of the unregistered party
‘Alga!’. Ablyazov's lawyer dismissed allegations of any
involvement of his client (such as provoking the distur-
bances or ﬁnancing the strikers) (Lillis, 2011d).
The leader of ‘Alga!’, Vladimir Kozlov, and other persons
who were accused of instigating the upheaval, were
consequently arrested. In November 2012, the Public
Prosecutor's Ofﬁce in Almaty requested that the court
recognise several public associations and mass media out-
lets in Kazakhstan as extremist organisations. In addition to
the unregistered political organisations ‘Alga!’ and ‘Khalyk
Maidany’, eight newspapers and 23 Internet resources
were categorised as extremist organisations, including the
Republika and Vzglyad newspapers and their websites, the
KTK TV channel and the Stan-TV Internet-portal. All these
organisations and mass media outlets are, in one way or
another, connected with Mukhtar Ablyazov.14
The blame for the conﬂict was also placed on Kazakh
ethnic repatriates, the oralman (Nesterov, 2011). In 2013,
consequently, the Kazakh authorities toughened the pro-
cedures for the resettlement for ethnic Kazakhs who lived
abroad and decided to return to Kazakhstan. In 2008, the
‘Nurly Kosh’ (Bright Settlement) state programme was
adopted to assist the migrants to settle in Kazakhstan and
to provide them with the necessary facilities. The pro-
gramme introduced quotas for the resettlement of oralman
taking into consideration demographic changes and the
country's economic and ﬁnancial situation. However, in
early 2012, ‘Nurly Kosh’ was suspended altogether until
further notice because a new programme was being
developed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. President
Nazarbayev stated that it was necessary to introduce13 “Shok budushchego” ili politicheskie strakhi kazakhstantsev (resul'-
taty sotsiologicheskogo oprosa), in: Al'yans Analiticheskikh Organizatsiy
(2013) ‘Sumerechnaya zona’ ili lobushki perekhodnogo perioda, Almaty:
Al'yans Analiticheskikh Organizatsiy, pp. 177e183.
14 ‘Prokuratura Almaty prosit priznat’ ekstremistskoi deyatel'nost' ryada
SMI, in: Today.kz, 21 November 2012, http://today.kz/news/kazakhstan/
2012-11-21/77089/.
15 “Shok budushchego” ili politicheskie strakhi kazakhstantsev (resul'-
taty sotsiologicheskogo oprosa)’, in: Al'yans Analiticheskikh Organizatsiy
(2013) ‘Sumerechnaya zona’ ili lobushki perekhodnogo perioda, Almaty:
Al'yans Analiticheskikh Organizatsiy pp. 142e201, 264.
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of optimal settlement of the country's population and to
cardinally arrive at an understanding with the oralman to
concentrate them in one place (Baizhanov, 2012).
According to informal information, all these measures
were connected with the fact that in the Zhanaozen events
of December 2011, oralman were also among the oilmen
who entered into the conﬂict with the authorities. The
Kazakh authorities suddenly began to understand that the
return of a large number of oralman, some of whom could
not effectively adapt to new conditions, presents a threat to
political stability, especially as the majority of the re-
patriates with secondary education do not possess the
required qualiﬁcations necessary to ﬁnd work in
Kazakhstan. Thus, it can be said that a new protest group
has arisen in Kazakhstan; by returning to their homeland,
the oralman either failed to adapt to the new conditions or
faced the corruption and unwillingness of local authorities
to render assistance to them (cf. Kus¸çu, 2014).
Parts of the ruling political elite have also been blamed
for instrumentalizing the protests. For example, in
December 2013, the Kazakh website ratel.kz published an
article by the journalist Gennadii Benditskii inwhich he put
forward the idea that the Zhanaozen unrest was provoked
not by the opposition but by people employed by the
Atyrau Region Akim (head) Bergei Ryskaliyev (Benditskii,
2013). Benditskii concluded that the reason was the
struggle for control over the Аtyrau Oil Reﬁnery (ANPZ),
which was about to enter the structure of KMG. Suppos-
edly, with the arrival of the new management at the plant
in 2011, Bergei Ryskaliyev lost control over ANPZ. There-
fore, he decided to strike a blow against KMG through its
subsidiaries operating in the Mangistau region, where
already for almost seven months there had been a
confrontation between KMG's management and its
workers.
Being aware of the weakness of their arguments about
the prevalence of only external factors in the Zhanaozen
conﬂict, the authorities felt it necessary to publicly
reshufﬂe personnel at the national oil and gas company
KMG and its subsidiaries, as well as in the Samruk-Kazyna
Fund where Timur Kulibayev lost his position. This was a
forced sacriﬁce on part of the president aimed to release
the pressure of the social tension and to improve his foreign
policy image, which could be seriously damaged by the
violent deaths in the course of the Zhanaozen conﬂict.
Further proof that internal rather than external factors
dominated the Zhanaozen conﬂict is an article by President
Nazarbayev published in the Kazakhstanskaya Pravda in
July 2012 (Nazarbayev, 2012). This article was a reaction to
the labour conﬂict in Zhanaozen focusing on the creation of
a new multilevel mechanism for regulating conﬂicts in la-
bour relations. Nazarbayev named two major reasons for
labour conﬂicts: ﬁrst, the lack of inclusion of employees in
management decisions of the enterprise (i.e., ‘social part-
nership’), and second, the weak mechanisms for extraju-
dicial settlement of labour disputes. In this regard, the
president proposed to strengthen administrative and
criminal liability, including for the delayed payment of
salaries, failure to fulﬁl collective bargaining agreements
and other offences. The president also ordered thegovernment to draft a ‘National Concept for the Social
Development of Kazakhstan’, together with the ruling ‘Nur
Otan’ party. Also discussed was the revision of the law ‘On
trade unions’, which should include the concept of ‘social
partnership’, mechanisms for concluding and fulﬁlling
collective bargaining agreements, as well as considerably
expanding state inspections of labour relations.
At the same time, the authorities have imposed a public
discourse on ‘social danger’ by representing the protest
participants as carrying danger to the rest of the society. It
was pointed out that the demands of demonstrators are
alien to the local population, in particular, it wasmentioned
that they were promoted by oralmen. Moreover, in the
ofﬁcial discourse a conspiracy became the main explaining
factor for the protests. Emphasis was placed on the claim
that the protests were not spontaneous and originated not
from oilmen, but from the opposition and dissatisﬁed elite
groups. In this context, there were several versions: ofﬁ-
cially, the authorities adhered to the opinion that behind
the protests there was the businessmanМukhtar Аblyazov.
Another unofﬁcial version focused on the participation in
these events of the brothers Ryskaliyev, who were inﬂu-
ential politicians from Western Kazakhstan. According to
ofﬁcial information, the brothers have left the country.
The common points of the public discourse on the
Zhanaozen protests are, ﬁrst, that large parts of society
cannot be trusted because they have evil intentions and,
second, that the country should beware of a serious danger
of chaos and anarchy.15 This discourse, thus, discourages
people from protest actions and allows the authorities to
toughen the regime of control and punishment.5. Conclusions
The social outburst in Mangistau started just as any
other labour conﬂict without the participation of opposi-
tion groups. The opposition might have joined it later,
trying to use the already explosive situation. However, at
the core of the conﬂict lies the lack of an efﬁcient mecha-
nism to solve work-related tensions. As the workers lack
institutionalized ways to demand improvements in their
situation, they are forced to refer to informal trade unions
and unregulated protest actions.
The lack of strong trade unions, in turn, is only one part
of a more serious problem in Kazakhstan's political system
in which almost all ofﬁcial political and social institutions
are artiﬁcial, weak players. There are political parties, but
there is no party system. There is a parliament, but it is not
an independent representative branch of power. There are
courts, but there is no rule of law. There are trade unions,
but there is no protection of labour rights. The dominant
role within this political system is played by informal
pressure groups.
The events of December 2011 in Zhanaozen have not
promoted a revision of the main principles of the
D. Satpayev, Т . Umbetaliyeva / Journal of Eurasian Studies 6 (2015) 122e129 129management of the political system. Instead, the political
elites preferred to react rigidly to the protests of the oil
company's employees and, on the whole, to toughen the
‘rules of the game’ in the political ﬁeld. At present, almost
no opposition parties remain in the country, while inde-
pendent mass media are harassed by the state. At the same
time, the role of the law enforcement bodies involved in the
suppression of protest actions is being strengthened.
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